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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 860208-CA

v.
Category No. 2

CAROL FOWLER,
Defendant-Appellant•

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

This appeal is from a conviction of second degree
felony theft after a trial in the Fourth District Court. This
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-2a-3(2) (e) (Supp. 1986).

The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the
State presented sufficient evidence at trial to prove all of the
elements of theft beyond a reasonable doubt?

mi£HE£I_QE_XB£_£&££
Defendant, Carol Fowler, was charged with theft, a
second degree felony, under UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-6-404 and -412
(1978) (R. 19). After a bench trial, the court found her guilty
of the charged offense (R. 56-58).

The court then sentenced

defendant to the Utah State Prison for a term of one to fifteen
years and ordered her to pay restitution in the amount of $72,000
(R. 63-64, 67) • Upon defendant's application for a certificate
of probable cause, the court issued a certificate, stayed
execution of the sentence, and ordered defendant released upon
her own recognizance (R. 65# 69).

The statutes pertinent to the issues raised on appeal
are set forth in the body of the brief.
miEMEMI_QE_EAClS
The essential facts in this case are not in dispute*
Over a two year period, defendant sought and received substantial
sums of money totalling over $70,000 from Ella Stevens, an
eighty-six-year-old neighbor in Payson, Utah, who had been
widowed for fifteen years*

At first, defendant requested money

for food to be used in her rabbit business, but her subsequent
requests were for larger sums purportedly to pay for everything
from car repairs to medical bills. Based upon these representations and alleged business receipts given her by defendant,
Stevens continued to give defendant money until Stevens's bank
became concerned and contacted both Stevens and the police.
Although Stevens recorded each dispersal of funds to defendant as
a loan and, based upon defendant's promises, fully expected to be
paid back, defendant had repaid at most several hundred dollars
(R. 86-97, 100-08) .
When the police interviewed defendant, she acknowledged
that she had received the money from Stevens, that she had been
unemployed except for a brief span during the two year period in
question, and that she had given Stevens false business receipts
to make it easier for Stevens to give her money.

The police

investigation of the receipts confirmed that none of them were
legitimate.

However, defendant maintained that she had always

intended to repay Stevens, although at the time she did not know
how she would accomplish that (R. 109-17).
-2-

Defendant took the stand at trial and admitted
receiving the money from Stevens by using false representations
of needing money for a variety of purposes.

She also admitted

that she lied to Stevens about her intent to pay back some of the
money on certain datesf but that she always intended to reimburse
Stevens.

She explained the false representations to Stevens by

stating, "I hated asking Ella for money, and so I would make up
these lies • . • to get the money" (R. 139-40, 145, 149-51).
At the close of the State's evidence, defendant moved
to dismiss the charge against her on the ground that there was no
evidence of the "unauthorized control" required by S 76-6-404.x
The trial court denied the motion (R. 121-23, 130). After
hearing all the evidence, the court found defendant guilty of
theft (R. 56-58) (a copy of the court's decision is attached as
Appendix A) .

Although defendant was charged with theft under § 76-6404, her conviction of the form of theft defined in S 76-6-40 5(1)
(theit by deception) is sustainable under S±a±fi_ju_lflylQl$ 570
P.2d 697 (Utah 1977).
Additionally, there was sufficient evidence before the
trial court from which it could reasonably find that defendant
had a "purpose to deprive," as that phrase is defined in § 76-6-

1HJLL3L.
* Section 76-6-404 provides*
A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises unauthorized control over the
property of another with a purpose to deprive
him thereof.
-i-

ABGIiMEHJ

THE STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT
TRIAL TO PROVE THAT DEFENDANT HAD COMMITTED
THEFT.
Defendant argues that the State did not present
sufficient evidence at trial to prove two essential elements of
theft under S 76-6-404:

(1) obtaining or exercising unau£b£2Liz£d

control; and (2) purpose to deprive. Before addressing this
argument^ a briet discussion of Utah's theft statute and the
nature of the charge in this case is necessary.
Utah has a consolidated theft statute.

UTAH CODE ANN.

S 76-6-403 (1978) provides:
Conduct denominated theft in this part
constitutes a single offense embracing the
separate offenses such as those heretofore
known as larceny, larceny by trick, larceny
by bailees, embezzlement, false pretense,
extortion, blackmail, receiving stolen
property. An accusation of theft may be
supported by evidence that it was committed
in any manner specified in sections 76-6-40 4
through 76-6-410, subject to the power of the
court to ensure a fair trial by granting a
continuance or other appropriate relief where
the conduct of the defense would be
prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by
surprise.
In Sia±£_XA_Ia*l2I$ 570 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme
Court recognized this principle:
The Utah theft statute consolidates the
offenses known under prior law as larceny,
embezzlement, extortion, false pretenses, and
receiving stolen property into a single
offense entitled £&£££# and clearly evidences
the legislative intent to eliminate the
previously existing necessity of pleading and
proving those separate and distinct offenses.
All that is now required is to simply plead
the general offense of theft and the

accusation may be supported by evidence that
it was committed in any manner specified in
sections 404 through 410 of the Code,
including that of receiving stolen property,
as was done in this case.
570 P.2d at 698 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

£££

Al££ S*fl.t£_JU_S£fik£fltfl , 638 P.2d 525, 526-27 (Utah 1981).
In the present case, although the prosecutor charged
defendant with theft under S 76-6-404, at trial, he advanced a
theory of theft by deception (£££ UTAH CODE ANN. SS 76-6-40 5(1)
and 76-6-401(5)(a) & (e) (1978)).2

Although this theory probably

could have been articulated more clearly, it seems obvious from

* Section 76-6-405(1) provides:
A person commits thett if he obtains or
exercises control over property of another by
deception and with a purpose to deprive him
thereof.
Sections 76-6-401(5)(a) & (e) provide:
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person
intentionally:
. . .

(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct
an impression of law or fact that is false
and that the actor does not believe to be
true and that is likely to affect the
judgment of another in the transaction; or

(e) Promises pertormance that is likely to
affect the judgment of another in the
transaction, which pertormance the actor does
not intend to perform or knows will not be
performed; provided, however, that failure to
perform the promise in issue without other
evidence of intent or knowledge is not
sufficient proof tnat the actor did not
intend to perform or knew the promise would
not be performed.

the prosecutor's argument to the trial court in response to
defendant's motion to dismiss that he intended to prove that
defendant obtained or exercised control over Stevens's money
through knowing misrepresentations of fact and promises of
repayment that defendant either did not intend to fulfill or knew
would not be fulfilled (R. 123-27) (the prosecutor's argument is
set forth in full as Appendix B ) .

In fact, he stated, "It's not

my claim that the defendant exercised imauJbb££i2£d control"
(emphasis added) (R. 123) —

a statement that clearly indicates

an intent to pursue a variation of theft that does not require
proot of "unauthorized control" as used in § 76-6-404, i.e.,
theft by deception defined in S 76-6-405(1).3

And, the trial

court, while making no reference to S 76-6-405(1), found all the
facts necessary for a conviction of theft by deception as defined
in SS 76-6-405(1) and 76-6-401(5)(a) & (e). (Appendix A ) .
Therefore, as to defendant's first claim on appeal that
there was no evidence of unauthorized control, the question is
whether defendant's conviction of theft by deception is
sustainable when the information charged him with theft under
S 76-6-404 rather than S 76-6-405(1).

This issue was resolved by

the Otah Supreme Court in SiflJtfi-JU-lfiXlfll, 570 P.2d 697 (Utah

3 The prosecutor's position that theft could be proved by simply
showing "the defendant obtained the property . . . with a purpose
to deprive the owner thereof" (R. 123) appears to be incorrect.
Obtaining control over the property of another with a purpose to
deprive him thereof, without more, is not theft under Utah law.
Sfifi SS 76-6-404 through 410. Although State v. Walker, 649 P.2d
16, 17 (Utah 1982), might be read to support that position, the
definition of "obtain or exercise unauthorized control" contained
in S 76-6-401(4) clearly does not allow the interpretation ot
S 76-6-404 proposed below.

1977) , where the defendant's conviction of theft by receiving
under S 76-6-408 was upheld even though the information charged
theft under S 76-6-404.

The Court rejected a defense argument

nearly identical to that presented here, on the grounds that the
consolidated theft statute rendered the slight variance between
the charge and the conviction insignificant,

Id. at 698.

In the

instant case, because defendant did not claim in the trial court
that the manner in which theft was charged and proved prejudiced
his defense by lack of fair notice or by surprise, and presents
no such claim on appeal, laylfll is controlling and requires
atfirmance of his conviction.

Id. at 698 n. 6.

No issue exists

concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding
of theft by deception.
Defendant's additional claim that the State's evidence
was insufficient to show a purpose to deprive may be disposed of
summarily.

Section 76-6-401(3) defines "purpose to deprive" as:

(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the
conscious object:
(a) To withhold property permanently or for
so extended a period or to use under such
circumstances that a substantial portion of
its economic value, or of the use and benefit
thereof, would be lost} or
(b) To restore the property only upon payment
of a reward or other compensation; or
(c) o dispose of the property under
circumstances that make it unlikely that the
owner will recover it.
Intent may be inferred from the actions of the defendant or from
the surrounding circumstances.fiiflifi_KA-iJllIPljy#674 P.2d 1220,
1223 (Utah 1983).

From the evidence presented at trial, the

•7-

court could have reasonably concluded that defendant had the
purpose to deprive Stevens of her money, as that phrase is
defined in S 76-6-401(3).

£fi£ Siflifi_y.A_IfiaacfiDjj, 704 P.2d 555,

558 (Utah 1985)) Statfi_X*_DiDi£lfi, 584 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah 1978).
Defendant's obtaining of the money with false representations of
fact and promises of repayment unsupported by any visible means
of making repayment was sufficient to sustain the court's finding
of a purpose to deprive; it simply was not obligated to believe
defendant's assertions to the contrary.
P.2d

See, JS£aifi_y.ji_MflD£jadfl,

, Ot. Ct. App. No. 860243-CA, slip op. at 1 (filed May

13, 1987) .
£QH£U2SIQU
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's
conviction should be affirmed..
DATED this .JZ^Tday

0f

June, 1987.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
(/
Assistant Attorney General
££m£I£AX£_QE_MAILIlK3
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid,
to Gary B. Weight, Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin, 43 .ast 200
North, P.O. Box L, Provo, Utah 84603, this _^_r^ay of June,
1967.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

**¥»« nit,
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

J
J
Case No. CR-86-4

vs.

*

CAROL FOWLER,

I

Defendant.

DECISION

I
)

This matter came on duly and regularly for trial
before the Court sitting without a jury at the specific
request of the defendant. The plaintiff appeared and was
represented by counsel Kent M. Barry, Esq. The defendant
appeared and was represented by counsel Gary H. Weight, Esq.
The Court thereupon heard the evidence adduced by the parties
in support of their respective positions, reviewed the
memoranda of counsel and upon being advised in the premises,
now finds beyond a reasonable doubt as follows:
1. (a) That during the two years immediately
prior to December 1985, the defendant obtained from Ella
Stevens the approximate sum of $70,200.00.
(b) That such money was obtained in Utah
County, Utah.
(c) That defendant contends that such sum was
obtained from Ella Stevens as loans.
(d) That during said period of time the defendant had no employment or earned income other than as a

-2-

flag person for approximately two months early in 1984.
(e) That Ella Stevens, a widow, is now 84 years
old and resides next door to the defendant.
(f) That the defendant during such two year
period visited almost daily with Ella Stevens thereby ingratiating herself to Ella Stevens.
(g) That defendant represented to Ella Stevens
that defendant was gainfully employed and had the means to
repay said money within a reasonable time; that such representations were false; that defendant repeatedly lied to Ella
Stevens about the need and purpose for which defendant sought
money from Ella Stevens; that defendant repeatedly falsified
records and receipts for the purpose of concealing from Ella
Stevens the real purposes for which said money was obtained
by the defendant from said victim; that defendant knew there
was no realistic possibility that defendant would be able to
repay said money to the victim and defendant's assertions to
the victim that such money would be repaid were nothing
more than a fraud and a sham to facilitate obtaining money

from the victim

and to deprive

the victim

thereof;

that

defendant was aware that her promises to repay said money
to the victim were reasonably certain not to be performed
and the defendant thus obtained such money from the victim
with the purpose to deprive the victim thereof.

(76-6-401

UGAs State v. Walker 658 P.2d 16)
2.

The Court therefore finds that the defendant

is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charge contained

-3-

in the Information.
3.

Defendant is ordered to appear before the

Court for the imposition of sentence on the Ath day of April
1986 at the hour of 9:00 o'clock a.m.
Dated this td'? £

day of March 1986.

BY THE COURT:

'IWfcvO'n''
Cullen Yj/ Christensen, Judge

cc:

County Attorney
Gary H. Height, Atty.

APPENDIX B

1

not paid at this point in time.

But it does not in my

21

opinion constitute criminal activity on this defendant's

3

part.

And we'd ask the Court to dismiss the Information.

4

THE COURT:

Mr. Barry?

5

MR. BARRY:

If I may respond to that,

6

your Honor.

7

I don't think you can really get a clear picture

8

about the case without looking at a couple of the letters

9

themselves.

There isn't a dispute in this case that the

10

defendant received that much money, at least $70,000.

11

admits owing that to the victim.

12

the defendant exercised unauthorized control.

13

that the defendant obtained the property, over a thousand

14

dollars, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof.

15

She

It's not my claim that
It's my claim

Now, I'm asking the court to infer an intent to

16

deprive the owner.

17

the acts of the defendant.

18

that defendant would give the victim all kinds of reasons

19

why she needed the money and give her receipts.

20

dant admits the receipts are phoney.

21

important, Judge, because if the defendant were going to

22

pay the money back, she would have to be an honest person,

23

and an honest person simply doesn't make up these phoney

24

receipts.

25

I'm asking the Court to infer that from
It's been shown to the Court,

The defen-

I think that's very

Let me give you just a couple of things out of the

II

letters from November 1985, Judge.

You can read these on

21

your own.

3 1

without some sort of inspection of them.

But I don't think you've got a clear picture

4

The ones I had her refer to, just read a letter:

5

''November 19.

Hey, I don't have a receipt for you

6

except a ticket.

I had to send it up to Salt Lake.

Last

7j

night was so cold, and I didn't have enough antifreeze in

8 J

my truck, and when I tried to start it I cracked the engine

9

block in three places.

If I don't get it fixed immediately

10

it will completely ruin the engine and transmission, and

11

that will cost about three thousand if it goes out.

12

got a 4:30 appointment to get it fixed, and the service

13

station will also start working on the engine block.

14

will cost $625.

15

I promise to pay you $3,500 on Thursday and $2,500 on the

16

30th of November."

It

So if I could please that, please, Ella,

17

No such payments were made, Judge.

18

"Thanks a million.

19

I've

You're a wonderful friend.

I love you very much."

20

"November 21.

Hey, we didn't get paid again

21

because the boss still isn't back from Washington.

22

had another heart attack, so he had to have open-heart

23

surgery.

24

us either because the check from the state is in the boss'

25

name."

He'll be back next Friday.

His dad

The foreman can't pay

1
21

Now, the defendant isn't employed, Judge, and
this is the kind of stuff she's telling the victim.

3

"And I'll pay you $6,000 on Friday, but I need

4

to pay insurance by 5:00 o'clock today.

5

and told me if I didn't have it paid by 5:00 o'clock he'd

6

give me a ticket and impound both of my cars, take my check,

7

the insurance and the truck, $350, for the car it's $200.

8

Also, since I'm totally out of gas, could 1 please borrow

9

a hundred dollars for that?

10

A cop stopped me

1 don't even have any gas to go

to work."

11

Again.

She wouldn't work.

12

"Have to be there at 12:30 this afternoon.

Ella,

13

I promised you I wouldn't borrow anymore money and I honestly

14

wouldn't be if I had gotten paid."

15

And she doesn't work, Judge.

16

"This money will be the last up until I get paid

17

next •-•

18

Could you please put it in my envelope and put it in my

19

envelope I did receive.

20

mail box I won't be able to go to work, because I have no

21

gas.

22

I'm going down to --•

Thanks a million.

could I please borrow $650?

Also, if you don't put it in my

I love you very much."

Again, Judge, I don't want to bore the Court with

23

all of these, but I think you can get a picture of how

24

preposterous some of this stuff is.

25

"November 16.

Hi.

Again, Judge:

As I was coming back from

1

getting my truck fixed I was stopped by the cop, and they gavej

2 1 me a ticket for not having studded snow tires.

This is

3

because it's a truck and they have to be on them by the 1st

4

of November.

5

Monday at noon.

6

away or they would have impounded the truck.

7

all of the money for the engine block because they still

8

haven1t fixed all of it.

9

Also, if I don't pay the ticket, I'll be arrested and put in

The ticket is $300, and I have to pay it by
Also, I had to have the tires put on right

10

jail for two years.

11

taken.

So I had to pay $160 for the tires.

Also, my vehicles and check will be

Since I didn't get paid Friday,"

12

She wasn't working, Judge.

13

"I don't have any gas or food.

14

borrow $80.

15

on the 30th.

16
17

I didn't pay

Can I please

I promise to pay you $3,500 on Thursday, $3,000
Please, Ella, help me one more time."

Judge, these are just the November letters.

It's

a pretty standard thing, if you want to review the letters,

18 I I have gone through them, she promised to pay when her income
19

tax refund came back.

20

a large income tax.

21

Insurance check that was supposed to come and never paid.

22

She wasn't employed.

She didn't have

She promised to pay her $1,500 from an

The routine is, Judge:

"I'll pay you on the 9th

23

of August"

That comes around.

"I'll pay you on the 16th

24

of August.

I'll pay you when I get paid.

25

16th, after the 16th.

Pay you on the

Well, I'll pay you on the 6th of

1

September.

2

when I get paid."

3 1

I 1 11 pay you

Promise to pay you this week.

That's what's going on, Judge.

If you'll go

4

through the letters, you don't need to read everyone of

5

them, but you can get an indication.

6

1985:

7
8

Back in February of

"Took $5,000 for U-joints, two control arms, all
of the wiring in my truck."

9I

All of these were supposedly to be some truck

10

repairs, Judge.

11

this amount of money.

12

to ask the Court to believe is that there was no question

13

that the defendant was lying continuously to the victim.

14

I'm going to ask the Court to believe that the defendant was

15

lying to the victim about when or if she was going to pay it

16

back.

17

that from the fact she lied about what she needed the money

18

for, what she used the money for, when she was going to pay

19

her back; that she was going to pay her back each and

20

every payday when she wasn't working.

21

of hundred dollars.

22

of the money she was giving back to keep the pot open.

23 I
24
25

She could have bought several trucks for
I think the thing that I would like

And

That's the inference I'm asking the Court to draw;

She paid her a couple

She didn't have a job.

It was just some

I think we have at least made out a prima facie
case.

Thanks.
MR. WEIGHT:

May I just briefly respond

